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Abstract: 
Since the mid-2000s, the Chinese party-state has increasingly focused on pursuing 
cultural diplomacy abroad to improve its national image and gain or enhance cultural 
soft power. Although China’s cultural “Charm Offensive” has not gone unnoticed, a 
variety of specific activities have not been subject to research so far. This paper 
therefore attempts to fill this research gap by analyzing Chinese state-level cultural 
diplomacy through a comparative case study of three China Culture Year events held 
in France (2004), Italy (2010) and Germany (2012). These findings are subsequently 
compared to the China Culture Year in Australia (2012), thereby allowing the 
identification of spatial variations. I argue that the Chinese party-state applies a 
general approach of organizing the events abroad by making use of local institutions. 
At the same time, through the strategic selection of events, the festivals portray 
distinct national images that transmit particular narratives of self-presentation to the 
European audience and take into account country-specific preferences.  
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Embarking on a cultural diplomacy mission 
In the age of expanding mass media and globalization, the generation of a positive 
international reputation is becoming increasingly important to nation-states. Since 
the launch of the Reform and Opening Policy in 1978 induced the political and 
economic rise of China, the Chinese party-state has also followed this trend. Yet, 
although China has invested heavily in generating a favorable reputation, its rise has 
not been gauged as a positive development. On the contrary, especially after the 
Tiananmen incident in 1989, international media and governments have interpreted 
China’s rise as a potential “threat” [1:758] to regional and global security. The 
Chinese party-state hence has been concentrating heavily on improving its national 
image. As a result, the self-presentation of the Chinese party-state, which is eager to 
display itself in a positive light, stands in direct opposition to the often negative, even 
hostile, national images it is ascribed in the international realm.  
In order to reduce this misalignment of national images, the party-state has since the 
mid-2000s embarked on a mission to improve its reputation abroad. In doing so it not 
only wishes to amend its reputation and portray its own views to a global audience, 
but also to generate “soft power,” which refers to the realization of national goals in 
international relations through enhanced political, economic and cultural 
attractiveness [2:5-6]. In this context, Chinese ancient culture has been appraised as a 
particularly valuable soft-power resource by the party-state as well as Chinese and 
international academia. One prominent example of the promotion of Chinese culture 
abroad was the 2004 launch of the “Confucius Institute initiative,” which established 
a global network of Chinese culture and language institutes. 
Despite an ample amount of research on this initiative, surprisingly little information 
has been generated concerning other activities such as Chinese cultural exchanges or 
festivals. This is astonishing since it is precisely an analysis of cultural festivals that 
would generate knowledge on what the Chinese party-state wants to demonstrate 
through the medium “Chinese culture” and which strategic approach it pursues in 
presenting this culture. To fill this research gap, this paper aims to answer the 
following questions: Firstly, which national cultural images and implicit self-
presentation narratives does the PRC attempt to transmit through Chinese cultural 
festivals in Western Europe? And secondly, which organizational approach can be 
identified behind the festivals? 
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In order to answer these questions, the paper undertakes a comparative case study of 
state-led cultural festivals, so-called China Culture Years (CCYs), in Western 
Europe. Specifically, I compare the festival programs of three European China 
Culture Years – in France (2004), Italy (2010) and Germany (2012) – with the China 
Culture Year in Australia (2012). Through this case selection, continent-specific 
similarities and differences in the organization of the event as well as program 
content become observable. In particular, comparing the individual programs in great 
detail and thus identifying frequently offered cultural events allows for an 
interpretation of the national cultural images and underlying narratives of self-
presentation behind these events. On the basis of this study, I argue that the party-
state disseminates diverging national cultural images to each target country examined 
depending on the tastes of the foreign audience at hand. In doing so it not only 
pursues political goals such as soft-power generation, but also aspires to display that 
China has overcome the historic “humiliation” it believes it suffered at the hands of 
foreign powers.   
I support this claim by first familiarizing the reader with the international and 
domestic Chinese academic discourse on China’s soft-power generation. For the 
purpose of helping the reader grasp the core concepts and theories used in this 
analysis, I explain this paper’s understanding of soft power, cultural diplomacy and 
national images in general and show how the concept has been appropriated into 
Chinese rhetoric by the party-state. In the main part of the article I discuss the results 
of the comparative case study, retrace the organizational approach utilized, and 
identify strategic national cultural images and implicit narratives presented by the 
party-state. The paper wraps up with an evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses 
of this Chinese cultural diplomacy strategy as well as concluding remarks.  
Cultural attractiveness as a soft-power resource 
Since Nye coined the term “soft power” in 1990, which refers to “getting others to 
want the outcomes that you want” [2:5], the term has gained prominence among 
international scholars and media. In particular, the concept argues that governments 
may influence policy agendas in the international community by shaping the 
preferences of other nations through their own national attractiveness. Common soft-
power resources are culture, political values and institutions as well as policies which 
are regarded as legitimate [2:5-11].  
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Shortly after the emergence of the concept, the idea of improving China’s 
international position through national image promotion was heavily debated in 
Chinese academia. Initial articles on how to formulate a “Chinese soft-power 
strategy” appeared in 1993. Here, Wang was the first Chinese scholar to regard 
Chinese culture as the most valuable resource [3:25] to diminish the emerging notion 
of the so-called “China threat.” The Chinese soft-power campaign, however, only 
became prominent in the mid-2000s [4:24] when Beijing initiated a multitude of 
campaigns to transmit positive national images. One example is the Chinese foreign 
policy of a “peaceful rise” (hépíng juéqǐ) (later coined the “peaceful path of 
development”) and a “harmonious world” (héxié shìjiè) of 2005 [5:193-198]. By 
incorporating ancient Confucian values into foreign policy, the party-state attempted 
to demonstrate its good intentions as a new major global player [6:76-81].  
The beginning of China’s pursuit of soft power, cleverly termed “China’s Charm 
Offensive” by Kurlantzick in 2007 [7], triggered widespread debate in academia and 
the media [ 8;9]. In this debate, China’s soft-power resources and strategies are 
believed to hold a number of potentials and limits. Besides the authoritarian character 
of its political system, limitations arise through China’s growing hard power. While 
China is attempting to present itself as a benign power, its increasing military 
expenditure and its unwillingness to undertake fundamental political reform remain 
obstacles to the successful accumulation of soft power [9:28-30]. Yet, China’s soft 
power can be seen as having profited from the decrease in US soft power over the 
last decade, with its comparative position strengthened internationally [10;11]. This 
development was made possible through China’s strategic dissemination of positive 
cultural and economic national images, which have been utilized to cultivate foreign 
relations, especially with developing countries [ 12:53]. In this context, Chinese 
traditional culture is regarded as China’s key cultural diplomacy resource by Chinese 
[9:25] and Western scholars [13:116] as well as the party-state. 
The Chinese understanding of the term soft power (ruǎnshílì) is not necessarily the 
same as that in the Western discourse. While Li, for instance, argues that Chinese 
academia strictly follows Nye’s definition and emphasizes Chinese culture and 
foreign policy as primary soft-power resources, she also states that in the Chinese 
discourse the term has gone beyond this understanding and includes a variety of 
resources not mentioned by Nye, such as mass media, socioeconomic development 
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or social cohesion and unity [9:25-28]. Kurlantzick supports this claim and states that 
the party-state mainly relies on its cultural and economic resources in its pursuit of 
soft power [7:6]. However, others indicate that the Chinese do not differentiate 
between soft and hard power at all but regard both powers as complimentarily 
contributing to China’s “comprehensive national strength” (zònghé guólì) [12:54]. 
Nevertheless, to accumulate soft power a nation needs to have favorable national 
images in the international community. When using the concept of “national 
images,” this paper refers to Boulding’s early idea of international reputation. 
According to Boulding, national images comprise the “total cognitive, affective and 
evaluative structure of the behavior unit or its internal view of itself and the 
universe” [14:120]. In this sense, there are two sides of national images. On the one 
hand, they are consciously developed by the nation-state, since they portray the 
nation and its opinion to a foreign audience in an attempt at self-presentation. On the 
other hand, national images constitute the sum of all associations made by other 
members of the international community, including subjective perceptions of the 
nation’s strengths and weaknesses [14:120-121], which can never be fully overcome 
by national self-presentation.  
In a manner comparable to advertising, strategic tools such as public and cultural 
diplomacy are commonly used to market an image globally [ 15:13-14]. Public 
diplomacy refers to governments’ efforts to advance communication with a target 
audience in order to foster understanding of their countries’ culture or national 
policies [16:3]. Depending on the definition some scholars also include non-state 
actors in their understanding of the term [17:7]. Activities that promote “cultural 
national images” abroad are part of cultural diplomacy, a subtype of public 
diplomacy [ 18:31-32]. However, the attribution of cultural diplomacy to public 
diplomacy is still subject to debate, as some scholars such as Aoki et al. rank cultural 
diplomacy among international cultural relations [19:212]. Nevertheless, this paper 
follows Cull’s classification of cultural diplomacy since the author understands 
cultural diplomacy as a tool that influences international cultural relations.  
Cultural diplomacy activities cover a wide range of campaigns and events. In 
general, they constitute a country’s “attempt to manage the international environment 
through making its cultural resources and achievements known overseas and/or 
facilitating cultural transmission abroad” [18:32-33]. The goal of cultural diplomacy 
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is thus to provide the target audience with an idea of a nation’s culture by initiating 
culture programs, festivals, exhibitions or performances [20:1-9]. Although cultural 
diplomacy efforts may be conducted on a bilateral basis, they are often characterized 
as creating a “sender-message-receiver” relationship between the nation-state on the 
one hand and the foreign audience on the other [21:217]. Following Gienow-Hecht 
and Donfried, cultural diplomacy can be analytically divided into two approaches. 
The structural approach describes the preceding organizational and administrative 
procedures behind cultural diplomacy. Content and inherent “narratives” which are 
to be transmitted to the target audience are part of the so-called conceptual approach 
[22:16-17]. Based on the assumption of a “sender-message-receiver” relationship, 
this paper uses these two approaches to examine Chinese cultural festivals, as Figure 
1 below illustrates. The Chinese nation-state uses cultural diplomacy to transmit 
strategic narratives of self-presentation to the target audience. Since every individual 
among the target audience holds a different attitude towards the sending nation-state, 
the cultural diplomacy measure leads to the creation of a variety of national cultural 
images. If the majority of these national cultural images prove to be favorable or 
positive, cultural soft power is accumulated. 
Figure 1: The Generation of Cultural Soft Power through Cultural Diplomacy 
 
 
 
Source: Christina Maags 
 
Although the PRC has expanded its use of cultural diplomacy, little is known about 
how China’s cultural diplomacy measures are organized abroad and which narratives 
of self-presentation are intended for transmission. While Chinese scholars have 
produced an extensive literature focusing on the promotion of cultural soft power 
(wénhuà ruǎnshílì) through, for instance, China’s traditional culture [23] and cultural 
industries [24], international research on Chinese cultural diplomacy has been rather 
limited. The Confucius Institute (CI) initiative is the most prominent example of 
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Chinese cultural diplomacy, as the number of institutes has skyrocketed in recent 
years and they demonstrate a strategic and efficient way of promoting Chinese 
culture abroad [25:70]. While the institute’s role in promoting the Chinese language 
as a global language [26:80] has been acknowledged, it has also been compared to a 
“Trojan horse” which could exert Chinese influence in the West. This argument is 
supported by the fact that the CIs are initially financed by the party-state and are 
subject to Chinese law [27:259]. 
In addition to the Confucius Institute initiative, research has been conducted on a 
number of other Chinese cultural diplomacy activities. Firstly, the educational sector 
functions as a means of cultural diplomacy, since it not only depicts China as a new 
educational power but also familiarizes the incoming students with Chinese culture. 
For this reason, the party-state invests heavily to attract foreign students [28:111-
118]. Furthermore, touring artist troupes are organized to advertise Chinese culture 
abroad. In 2000, for instance, Zhang and Cameron examined an artist troupe 
campaign launched in the United States by the PRC and detected a positive short-
term influence on China’s national image [29:24]. Finally, the party-state attempts to 
increase its exports of cultural products so as to enhance its cultural influence 
internationally and become a major “cultural power” [30:144-146]. 
In order to systematically examine Chinese cultural festivals, this study works 
inductively to generate hypotheses on the transmission of narratives of self-
presentation by the Chinese party-state through cultural festivals in Western Europe. 
As stated in the introduction, the study undertakes a comparative analysis of three 
Western European cases of the Chinese culture festival China Culture Year (CCY) in 
France (2004), Italy (2010) and Germany (2012). The findings of this analysis1 are 
then compared to a non-European case, the CCY in Australia, to identify potential 
spatial variations in the party-state’s cultural diplomacy. The study utilizes the 
conceptual and structural approaches outlined above; these tools allow for an 
analysis of the festivals’ organizational procedures as well as the national images 
portrayed through the program content. The paper’s research design not only retraces 
the sender-receiver relationship, but also reveals country-specific narratives of 
presentation. 
                                               
1 The data set used in this study, which contains a list of all events, is available upon request. 
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Cultural diplomacy institutions, actors and policies in China 
After the founding of the People’s Republic in 1949, Chinese traditional culture was 
repressed and replaced by “socialist culture” as a tool for cultural diplomacy. At first, 
Chinese socialist culture was only to be advertised to fellow socialist countries, yet 
later this practice was also pursued in connection with non-socialist countries 
[31:184]. With the Reform and Opening period, Chinese traditional culture was 
domestically revitalized and is still used as a means to strengthen national unity 
[ 32 :363] and to counter the influence of Western culture. Internationally, the 
People’s Republic has moved to intensively enhance bilateral cultural agreements 
since the late 1990s [33:1-16]. Thus there has been substantial support for cultural 
diplomacy activities, particularly since the mid-2000s [4:24]. 
This stronger emphasis on cultural diplomacy has found its way into various party 
documents and cultural policies. After the “Administrative Provision of Foreign 
Related Culture and Art Performances and Exhibitions” was issued in 1997 [34], 
regulating the conduct of Chinese cultural diplomacy abroad, a great variety of 
policies and provisions followed, particularly during the 2000s. With the beginning 
of the Hu/Wen administration, bilateral cultural diplomacy activities intensified. The 
new leaders supported cultural diplomacy by issuing a number of policies such as the 
“Formulation and Development of External Cultural Exchange Policy” in 2003 [35]. 
In 2006 the PRC announced the first “National Five-year Plan for Cultural 
Development,” which promoted the export of Chinese cultural products [8:76]. In 
2007, Hu explicitly set the strategic target of transforming China into a major 
cultural power [ 36 ]. Finally, the goal of advancing Chinese culture through a 
“cultural systems reform” (wénhuà tǐzhì gǎigé) was proclaimed during the Sixth 
Plenary Session of the Seventeenth CCP Central Committee in October 2011. During 
this event the Chinese party argued in favor of intensifying the reform domestically 
while simultaneously enhancing cultural soft power through the dissemination of 
Chinese culture abroad [37]. 
Responsibility for the formulation and implementation of concrete policies rests with 
a number of ministries and party organs that oversee policy enforcement. First and 
foremost, the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) Central Publicity Department 
(zhōngyāng xuānchuán bù) and its many subsidiary offices monitor every area of 
internal (duìnèi) or foreign (duìwài) publicity. Here the CCP’s Office of External 
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Publicity (zhōngyāng duìwài xuānchuán bàngōngshì) is of vital importance as it 
creates plans and guidelines for the development of public diplomacy, monitors 
foreign media and supervises domestic media. As the head of the Office of External 
Publicity is simultaneously the head of the State Council Information Office (SCIO), 
these party and state organs work together very closely [38:58-61]. In addition to this 
collaboration, many other state agencies cooperate closely with party organs in 
charge of safeguarding the correct implementation of policies by the state organs. 
Among the most important state agencies for the implementation of cultural 
diplomacy are the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the Ministry of Education 
(MOE), the Ministry of Culture (MOC) [4:27-40] and the above-mentioned SCIO, 
all of which are directly subordinate to the State Council [ 39]. These agencies 
oversee affiliated departments directly engaged with cultural diplomacy. The 
Information Office (xīnwénsī) under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for instance, 
supervises its own Public Diplomacy Office (gōnggòng wàijiāo bàngōngshì) [40], 
and the Ministry of Culture regulates its Bureau of External Cultural Relations 
(duìwài wénhuà liánluòjú) [ 41 ]. Yet, due to overlapping jurisdictions, the 
responsibilities of the individual state and party authorities remain blurred and a 
potential source of conflict [42:31-32]. Furthermore, the work of these authorities is 
supported at the grassroots level by government-organized nongovernmental 
organizations (GONGOs) such as the Chinese People Association for Friendship 
with Foreign Countries (CPAFFC), initiated in 1954 [ 43 ], and the China 
International Cultural Association (CICA), set up in 1986 [44].  
Beating the big drum for Chinese culture in Europe 
Since the early 2000s, the PRC and Western European states have begun to 
strengthen their cultural ties by engaging in reciprocal cultural diplomacy. Europe 
and China have a reciprocal interest in maintaining good foreign relations with their 
key partners in trade. However, their relations are frequently subject to conflicts in 
the political arena [12:147-54]. European countries and the PRC therefore both 
pursue cultural diplomacy in order to enhance cooperation and strengthen political 
ties through culture. Another motivation for the Chinese party-state is its wish to 
improve its national image among European citizens by spreading and marketing 
Chinese culture. Since “China wants to be acknowledged and respected as an ancient 
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but vibrant culture” [13:167], the global spread of its cultural values is of vital 
importance to the PRC [13:167-68]. 
Despite China’s negative political national image in Europe, its rise triggered a 
strong interest in the People’s Republic among European citizens. This trend led to 
an increased demand for activities such as Chinese language training, cultural events 
and exhibitions, something which the party-state is eager to nourish [13:163]. 
Between 2004 and 2013 Hanban (Confucius Institute Headquarters) established 140 
Confucius Institutes and 126 Confucius Classrooms in 35 European countries and 
regions [45]. In addition to the CI initiative, China Culture Centers (CCCs) have 
been established worldwide, also offering a multitude of language classes and 
cultural events. To date three centers have been opened in Europe: Paris, Malta and 
Berlin [46]. Along with these activities, based in the target country, a variety of 
academic exchange programs have been set up to increase the number of foreigners 
visiting China to learn about Chinese language and culture [9:18-19].  
In addition to the unilateral promotion of Chinese culture abroad, the PRC also 
engages in cooperative cultural diplomacy. Since 2004, bilateral “Culture Years” 
have been organized with a growing number of European states. As part of this 
cultural diplomacy, the People’s Republic is invited to demonstrate its national 
culture to the national audience; the partner country then presents its culture to the 
Chinese audience [47]. In Western Europe, three so-called China Culture Years have 
been held to date: France (2003) [48], Italy (2010) [49], Germany (2012) [47]. 
The China Culture Year in France (2004) 
In Western Europe, France has historically played the role of a vanguard in building 
relations with the PRC. It was the first Western European country to establish 
diplomatic relations with the party-state in 1964, and the subsequent bilateral cultural 
agreement of 1980 officially established cultural relations. Since then, China and 
France have successfully organized numerous cultural events such as the China 
Cultural Week in Paris in 1999. The reformulation of the French-Chinese cultural 
agreement in 2002 further expanded these efforts by including the construction of 
mutual cultural centers in its objectives [33:14-15]. During the reformulation of the 
new cultural agreement, the two countries agreed to organize a mutual Culture Year 
in the near future. France thus became the first European country to hold a China 
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Culture Year, from 2003 to 2004; a French Culture Year in China from 2004 to 2005 
followed [48]. Due to the French role as a vanguard and the potential learning effect 
for Chinese organizers, the French CCY can be interpreted as providing the 
“blueprint” for subsequent CCYs in Europe, since it provided opportunities to 
experiment with organizational procedures as well as program content for later 
CCYs. 
 
Officially, representatives of the French and Chinese governments mutually 
organized the CCY by establishing a joint organizing committee. However, in most 
cases it was the Chinese Ministry of Culture, its subordinate agencies [48] and 
GONGOs such as the China International Culture Exchange Center (CICEC) 
(Zhōngguó guójì wénhuà jiāoliú zhōngxīn) [50] that acted as the main organizers. 
Events such as the Film Week were organized by the Chinese and French agencies as 
follows: the Sino-French Cultural Association cooperated with the Chinese Ministry 
of State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television (SARFT), thereby ensuring 
Chinese agencies’ ability to determine the event’s content. In addition to ministries, 
the cultural bureaus of Chinese municipalities party to “twinning” agreements with a 
French town or province also assisted with the organization. Finally, the Chinese 
Culture Center located in Paris, which was the first of its kind to be established in 
Europe, in 2002 [51], also supported the planning and organization of the CCY [52].   
 
The French CCY was structured according to four major themes: The first, “Eternal 
China,” comprised eight exhibitions on manifestations of Chinese traditional culture 
such as the Dunhuang site or Jingdezhen porcelain [48]. Here, the name “Eternal 
China” hinted at the longevity of the Chinese empire, which not only endured for 
5000 years but will also continue to prevail. The second theme, “China’s Traditions 
and Diversity,” was covered in eight events related to Chinese daily life, including 
Chinese gardens, music and traditional dance [48]. Although this theme featured 
Chinese traditional culture as the first theme, the narrative behind the name implied 
that Chinese culture is not only eternal but also rich and diverse. The organizers 
offered nine events on contemporary art, photography and cinema as a part of the 
third theme, “Chinese Creators and Modernity,” thereby suggesting that Chinese 
culture is modern and innovative and thus comparable to Western culture. Finally, 
theme four, “Twin Towns,” presented French cities that had signed a twinning 
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agreement with a Chinese town [48], thereby displaying Sino-French municipal and 
provincial cultural cooperation. In total, the 35 cultural events represented an equal 
selection of contemporary and traditional Chinese culture.  
 
Despite the focus on Chinese culture, the organizers also included two fashion shows 
as part of the theme “Chinese Creators and Modernity.” These events stick out since 
they did not have an obvious connection to Chinese culture itself. However, since 
fashion is a common association made with France, these events can be seen as 
having been incorporated in order to cater to target audience preferences. This 
indicates that the CCY organizers intentionally included events that would appeal to 
the target audience in order to attract a greater number of visitors.  
The China Culture Year in Italy (2010) 
Equally interested in China’s reform and opening up, Italy has also pursued the 
advancement of cultural relations with the PRC. After the Italian government 
established diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China in 1970, the two 
states signed an agreement on cultural cooperation in 1978 [33:7-8], which also 
included the establishment of 40 provincial and municipal twinnings [53]. Since 
1999 China and Italy have engaged in more extensive cooperation, organizing 
cultural exchanges such as the Sino-Italian “Cultural Cooperation Plan” from 2004–
2007 [54]. More recently an executive program focusing on cultural collaboration 
between China and Italy was established for the period 2009–2012 [53:10]. 
The China Culture Year in Italy (October 2010–November 2011) represented this 
stronger emphasis on cultural cooperation. In the preparation of this event to 
commemorate the fortieth anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations, 
the MOC and its affiliated institutions again functioned as the main organizers. 
Municipal and provincial governments in Italy and China supported the ministry and 
participated in the preparation of cooperative projects. One example is the provincial 
government of Anhui, which not only organized the event but also sent its vice-
governor, Hua Jianhui, and a delegation of 130 government and local business 
representatives to attend Anhui Week [55]. Finally, local Chinese cultural institutes 
and associations assisted with the organization [49].  
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During the Italian CCY, 45 major events took place across the country. In contrast to 
the French CCY, the organizers did not assign the events to a number of themes but 
merely listed them according to their date. This design implies that the original use of 
themes as applied in the blueprint was gauged as unsatisfactory. Furthermore, the 
distribution of events revealed a comparatively stronger focus on contemporary 
culture, which accounted for 57.7 percent of the program in comparison to traditional 
culture events at 26.6 percent.  
Great emphasis was placed, firstly, on the display of Sino-Italian historical 
encounters and cultural cooperation projects, with such content accounting for 20 
percent of the program. Moreover, the CCY organizers highlighted exhibitions of 
contemporary art, which made up 17 percent of the content, suggesting that they 
expected a strong interest in these events on the part of the Italian visitors. 
In addition to these culture-related events, 15.5 percent of the program content 
consisted of scientific or technological events such as the “Chinese-Italian Forum on 
Innovation” or the Conference on Water, Renewable Energy and the Use of Thermal 
Energy. In fact, the organizers incorporated seven events that went beyond the realm 
of culture and referred to China’s economy, its tourism sector, and environmental 
protection, as well as its banks and financial institutions [49]. By incorporating 
narratives regarding Chinese innovative industries and sustainable development, 
these events directly referenced the concept of the “Scientific Outlook on 
Development” (kēxué fāzhǎn guān) announced in 2004. This concept argued that the 
PRC needs to achieve a development model focused not only on economic growth 
but also on socially acceptable and sustainable development [56]. The organizers’ 
use of a domestic Chinese concept in cultural diplomacy suggests that they were 
attempting to promote this narrative in Western Europe and foster Sino-Italian 
industrial collaboration. In this context, local enterprises acting as representatives of 
the PRC’s industry were particularly advertised. This is exemplified by the Anhui 
province delegation, which presented 200 projects worth US$83.5 billion of 
investment during Anhui Week [55]. Like the French CCY, the Italian case can thus 
also be regarded as being tailored to the Italian target audience, not only taking the 
general public’s interest into account but also catering to the interests of 
entrepreneurs and officials. 
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The China Culture Year in Germany (2012) 
The Sino-German (FRG) agreement on cultural cooperation in 1978 paved the way 
for greater German cultural involvement through the establishment of Goethe 
Institutes or the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) in China. As a result 
of the initiation of a new cultural exchange program in 1993, bilateral cultural ties 
were further strengthened. As part of the party-state’s enhanced emphasis on cultural 
diplomacy, the PRC organized a Chinese Week in Germany in 2001, the largest 
event of its kind in Europe until then [33:11-15]. Later, in 2005, the two nations 
signed a new cultural cooperation agreement that emphasized the promotion of 
cultural awareness in each other’s countries as well as the fostering of cultural, 
educational and scientific exchange [ 57 :37]. In order to celebrate the fortieth 
anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations, the PRC again proposed a 
China Culture Year for Germany in 2012 [47], thus expanding the presence of CCYs 
in Europe. 
As in France and Italy, the Chinese party-state kept to its strategy of formally 
arranging the festival during meetings with high-ranking state representatives and 
utilizing the MOC to plan the event through its cooperation with a Sino-German 
organization committee. In addition, other organizers officially contributed to the 
event, namely, German and Chinese cultural institutions such as the Goethe Institute, 
the Confucius Institutes, the China Culture Center in Berlin, and twin cities, as well 
as a number of museums and academic institutions. It is also noteworthy that in the 
German CCY a large number of companies were explicitly listed as sponsors of the 
event, something that implies increased attention to the incorporation of Chinese and 
German enterprises in the festival. Examples include the Gabriele Minz GmbH and 
the Volkswagen AG as well as TV stations such as ARTE TV and RTL TV [47]. 
In contrast to the Italian CCY, the organizers again arranged the German CCY 
according to five themes; however, they did not include implicit narratives in the 
names. As a part of the first theme, “Music,” the organizers set up ten events on 
classical Western, traditional and popular music. Contemporary culture as manifested 
in photography, sculpture or architecture was portrayed in theme two, “Arts and 
Design,” which comprised 19 events. The third theme, “Cultural Dialog,” discussed 
Sino-European interactions in six events referring to education, scientific exchange 
and the implications of the Chinese rise. Theme four, “Theater and Dance,” consisted 
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of six modern and traditional theater and dance performances. Finally, the fifth 
theme “Special Projects,” focused on twinning projects and the CCC in Berlin, 
illustrating Sino-German cooperation through 17 events. Similarly to the Italian case, 
the distribution of the 58 events also shows a greater emphasis on contemporary 
Chinese culture (56.9 percent), especially in the form of art exhibitions, classical 
musical performances, and Chinese architecture and design [58].  
If we compare the German CCY to the previous cases, the program again 
demonstrates a focus on country-specific content. The organizers firstly highlighted 
contemporary music, art and architecture, suggesting that they assumed a stronger 
interest in these areas among the German target audience. In addition, the events for 
the themes “Cultural Dialog” and “Special Projects” particularly illustrated Sino-
German scientific, economic and cultural cooperation, promoting China as a valuable 
partner in these areas. Hereby the party-state again accentuated China’s innovative 
industry and sustainability through the incorporation of scientific and technological 
events; however, as it displayed these events through Sino-German cooperative 
projects, an emphasis was put on the mutual benefit arising through the Chinese rise 
instead of merely advertising Chinese industry [58].  
The China Culture Year in Australia (2012) 
After the Australia-China Council (ACC) was established in 1978, the two nations 
launched many cultural projects to enhance people-to-people relations [ 59 ]. 
Following the initial bilateral cultural agreements between China and Australia in 
1981, the two countries agreed to establish a number of programs under the 
Agreement on Cultural Cooperation – most recently the Cultural Exchange Program, 
which came into being in 2012. The latter program resulted in an increase in cultural 
exchange projects for the period 2013–2015 [60]. In addition, the Year of Chinese 
Culture in Australia (YCCiA) - “Experience China” (from June 2011 to June 2012) 
formally celebrated the fortieth anniversary of Sino-Australian diplomatic relations 
[61]. 
Again it was the MOC and the cultural office of the Chinese Embassy in Australia 
that mainly carried out the organization of the festival. On behalf of the Australian 
government, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Department of the 
Prime Minister and Cabinet and the municipal government of Sydney contributed to 
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organizing the event. Moreover, a multitude of companies acted as official sponsors. 
Next to Chinese companies such as Huawei, Air China, China Southern and Sinopec, 
Australian companies including Rio Tinto, ANZ, and Telstra also sponsored the 
festival [61]. 
The Australia CCY followed the slogan “Experience China.” The organizers thus 
designed the event to offer the target audience the opportunity to discover China and 
to form its own opinion on the country. In particular, the organizers structured the 
program and its 45 events into seven neutrally formulated themes: The first theme, 
“Visual Arts,” comprised ten main events displaying exhibitions of Chinese 
traditional and contemporary arts as well as designs. Introducing Chinese “Music,” 
the second theme, consisted of five performances of classical music, traditional 
Chinese instruments and Inner Mongolian traditional music. Four main events 
dealing with the medium “Film” were the topic of the third theme, which presented, 
among other films, the founding of China in Beginning of the Great Revival. As part 
of themes four and five, “Theatre” and “Dance,” five modern theater events and five 
contemporary and traditional dance events took place. The sixth theme, “Literature,” 
only comprised one event, namely, a three-week-long book fair called “Discovering 
China.” Finally, the seventh theme, “Others,” consisted of ten miscellaneous events 
such as dance and classical music [62]. This distribution again concentrated on 
contemporary culture, which accounted for 62.2 percent of the events. In sum, the 
majority of events involved theater or contemporary art and design.  
The Australian CCY demonstrated a slightly different focus from the European 
cases. Firstly, the Australian case incorporated a greater number of events related to 
Chinese “popular culture,” such as modern theater, film and sports. This focus could 
be due to the large proportion of Australian citizens of Chinese descent who are 
strongly interested in Chinese popular culture [63:77]. Again, the program content 
seems to have been tailored to the taste of the target audience. Secondly, events 
relating to Tibetan and Mongolian culture were represented in Australia, while they 
were absent in all European cases. This finding shows that the Chinese party-state 
was reluctant to demonstrate China’s ethnic minority culture to European citizens, 
while it did not hesitate to display this content to an Australian audience. This 
suggests that the PRC expected a less critical response from the Australian audience 
on this sensitive issue. 
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China’s cultural self-portrait in Europe  
Structural approach  
If we reconstruct the party-state’s procedure for implementing CCYs, we find that 
three steps are characteristic in the negotiation and organization of the cultural 
festivals. Firstly, the party-state makes use of state-level diplomatic events to address 
the intent of organizing a mutual state-level cultural festival. One strategic element 
common to all cases examined here was the proposal to hold the event in the year of 
the fortieth anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations with the country 
in question, thereby sending a strong symbolic message of friendship and 
cooperation to the target audience.  
Secondly, following the official agreement to organize such an event, the party-state 
triggers a multi-actor and multi-level mechanism inside and outside of China. At the 
state level, the Ministry of Culture and its subordinate bureaus are most actively 
engaged in organizing and sponsoring the event. In many cases the MOC presents 
itself as the main organizer of the CCY and is listed as the contact agency for further 
inquiries [64]. Next to state-level cultural institutions, the cultural bureaus at the 
provincial and municipal levels support the organization process, particularly 
through their twinning relationships. Besides Chinese agencies operating from China, 
various actors and their local networks in the target country offer a valuable access 
point for the implementation of the CCY’s program. Along with the cultural bureaus 
of the Chinese embassies, the newly established China Culture Centers and 
Confucius Institutes play a leading role in organizing and fine-tuning the festival to 
local preferences [65:3] and often provide the venues and staff for holding CCY 
events. Ultimately, despite the fact that they work in cooperation with target-country 
representatives, the Chinese organizers strongly influence program content, thereby 
communicating strategic national images and narratives of self-presentation to the 
target audience.  
Conceptual approach  
In addition to a common structural approach, the European cases also demonstrate 
clear commonalities in the conceptual approach. All European CCYs analyzed 
included a blend of events relating to contemporary and traditional Chinese culture. 
Among the cultural events, a package with “core events” constituted the integral part 
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of the program. Events shown in all European cases analyzed were as follows: 
modern ballet, classical music and contemporary art exhibitions. Additionally, the 
organizers tailored the program according to the respective target audience’s tastes so 
as to make the program more appealing to the visitors. While the French CCY 
presented two events related to fashion, the Italian case included a great emphasis on 
cultural and economic cooperation. The German case focused heavily on 
contemporary music as well as architecture and design. D’Hooghe’s [13:168] and 
Li’s [65:3] argument that cultural diplomacy activities by the party-state are “fine-
tuned” to local tastes is thus supported by this study, which suggests that the 
inclusion of local preferences is an integral part of the China Culture Year program.  
Despite many similarities, the CCYs also differed on certain accounts: Firstly, 
although the French CCY provided the blueprint and demonstrated an equal share of 
50 percent traditional and 50 percent contemporary culture, the subsequent cases 
offered a disproportionate amount of contemporary culture, ranging from 
approximately 57 to 63 percent. Secondly, in some cases the “core program” was 
further extended by additional scientific-technological or economic content of 
approximately 5 to 15 percent. As this extension was part of both the Italian and 
German cases, one can presume that the PRC’s advertisement of its “sustainable 
development” and “innovativeness” were later included in the CCY blueprint for 
European cases. These findings are in line with previous studies illustrating the 
Chinese strategy to generate soft power by simultaneously investing in its economic 
and cultural national images [63:86]. Finally, subsequent organizers omitted specific 
design elements or added new ones to the blueprint, such as descriptive theme names 
or slogans. This indicates that although the majority of the blueprint characteristics 
were maintained, the organizers also further developed the CCY design over the 
years.   
If we compare the European cases to the Australian case, we find that the latter 
shows a similar structural and conceptual approach. As in the German case, the 
organizers not only chose a strategic slogan for the Australian CCY, “Experience 
China,” deploying it as a means of transmitting narratives of self-presentation, but 
also divided the events into neutrally formulated themes. Like the Italian and German 
cases, the organizers put a stronger emphasis on contemporary culture (55.6 percent). 
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Lastly, the Australian program incorporated country-specific content, illustrating the 
aim of interesting the Chinese diaspora in Australia [66].  
While all the European cases included traditional Chinese opera, national orchestra 
concerts, events related to higher education, these were not included in the Australian 
CCY. Here the organizers put a greater focus on popular culture such as movies or 
martial arts. As stated above, a possible motivation to include popular culture could 
have been the larger number of Australians of Chinese descent who are more familiar 
with and interested in current Chinese pop culture [63:77]. Another divergence in the 
Australian case was events related to ethnic minority culture, such as exhibitions of 
Tibetan paintings and Mongolian music. The inclusion of this content could be 
explained by Australia’s historical experiences with its own ethnic minorities, which 
may have led to the reasoning that Australians would be less critical about this issue. 
An additional motivation could have been that the large number of visitors of 
Chinese descent would expect Chinese culture to also include its ethnic minority 
cultures. Finally, content referring to the PRC’s innovativeness or sustainability was 
entirely absent in the Australian CCY, while two out of three European cases 
witnessed a great number of such events. This finding is astonishing since Australia 
is also an important trade partner of the PRC [67]. One explanation could be that 
because the Australian public has held a more favorable opinion of China over the 
last decade than, for instance, Germany or Italy, which hold the least favorable 
opinions among European countries [68], the Chinese organizers opted to use a 
combined soft-power approach in Europe – using economic and cultural resources – 
but regarded cultural resources as sufficient in Australia.  
Narratives of self-presentation in cultural national images 
On an implicit level, the CCY theme names, festival slogans and individual events 
are tools to transmit strategic narratives of self-presentation to the target audience. 
During the first French CCY, which provided the blueprint for subsequent CCYs, the 
program coordinators chose to use theme names. The first theme, “Eternal China,” 
evoked a picture of the Chinese state’s longevity that demonstrated China’s self-
confidence, cultural superiority and equality to Western powers. The second theme 
“China’s Traditions and Diversity,” pointed to the magnitude of diverse Chinese 
traditions. Surprisingly, however, only Han-Chinese traditions were included in the 
theme. This narrative implied that there is a great diversity in Chinese culture 
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without explicitly mentioning ethnic minority cultures. By referring to “Chinese 
Creators and Modernity,” the third theme, the party-state underlined China’s 
progress and innovativeness. However, no reference was made to technological 
innovation, with only cultural events such as orchestras or ballet performances 
included. The fourth theme, “Twin Towns,” portrayed concrete examples of cultural 
cooperation between China and the target country, thus presenting China to the 
visitors as a cooperative and responsible partner. 
The use of festival slogans in subsequent CCYs, was a second means of transmitting 
implicit narratives of self-presentation. For instance, in the German case the slogan 
“CHINAH” was used, an amalgamation of the German words for “China” and 
“Near”. This suggested that China is a close friend that needs to be experienced in 
order to be fully understood. Moreover, this narrative revealed the Chinese intent to 
make Chinese culture and values more accessible to the target audience and counter 
international criticism against China. The narrative furthermore directly coincided 
with the PRC’s official statement of attempting to foster a better understanding of 
China and its citizens abroad [69], as well as with the unofficial goal of making its 
own opinion heard internationally [70:256]. 
The distribution of particular types of events within a CCY has been a third means to 
transmit specific national images and narratives of self-presentation to the European 
audience. Firstly, the extensive incorporation of modern ballet, classical music and 
contemporary art exhibitions indicates that the Chinese party-state wants to present 
the national image of China’s “high culture” (in contrast to popular culture). Since 
these events are classic examples of Western “sophisticated culture” [71:329-380], 
this narrative suggests that Chinese culture is also to be regarded as “high culture” on 
par with Western culture. This intent could be based on the notion that China has 
undergone “a century of humiliation” [72:200-201] at the hands of Western powers, 
which is being redressed today by China’s national strength. Finally, the PRC’s goals 
of offering an alternative to Western culture and demonstrating a superior national 
culture [9:27-28] coincide with such displays of “high culture.”  
Secondly, the omission of ethnic minority culture in the European examples reveals 
that the Chinese party-state intentionally did not highlight the existence of such 
culture in Europe, while it did so in the Australian context. This suggests that the 
party-state attached greater importance to portraying cultural unity to the European 
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audiences than in Australia, where even the opening ceremony, “The Legend of 
Shangrila,” exhibiting ethnic minority culture [67] referred to Tibetan culture. This 
restricted mode of self-presentation in Europe could, on the one hand, have been 
grounded in the strong European advocacy of human rights and democratic values 
[13:167-68]. On the other hand, Australia’s experience with its own ethnic minorities 
may have motivated China to more strongly represent its ethnic minority cultures in 
this case. All in all, as Chinese scholars view the portrayal of social cohesion and 
unity as an element of soft power, the national image of “cultural unity” further 
substantiates Chinese soft power. 
Thirdly, the explicit inclusion of events highlighting Chinese innovativeness in the 
European cases not only reflects China’s unorthodox approach of using cultural 
resources in combination with economic resources for soft-power accumulation but 
also indicates its attempt to portray an “innovative” China. As the European 
countries examined are important trade partners for China, the implicit advertisement 
of China’s innovativeness could have been intended to further boost economic trade 
and foster trust in the Chinese economy. Furthermore, by linking Chinese 
innovativeness with twinning events, the PRC promoted location marketing in the 
individual European countries, which compete against each other for shares of the 
Chinese market. Jia argues that an economic platform is advantageous for the 
diffusion of Chinese culture through cultural products; while on the other hand 
Chinese national images are promoted on a cultural platform [73:13]. Or to use 
Hartig’s words: “Chinese culture is understood as a pathfinder for Chinese economy 
abroad” [25:70]. 
Fourthly, China portrayed itself as a responsible power concerned about global issues 
such as environmental protection and sustainability. By including CCY events 
demonstrating the PRC’s cooperation with each target country in finding solutions 
to, for instance, renewable energy, China depicted itself as a growing, responsible 
super power that is aware of global concerns and strives for future sustainable 
development. The fourth strategic national image transmitted can thus be said to 
portray China’s focus on “sustainable development.”  
These results clearly support the claim that the party-state transmitted strategic 
narratives of self-presentation to European citizens through national images. I 
therefore argue that the PRC communicated at least four specific national images 
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through the European China Culture Year festivals analyzed, namely, (1) China’s 
sophisticated “high culture,” which is “on par” with European high culture; (2) 
“cultural unity” among ethnic Chinese citizens; (3) China’s “innovativeness” and 
progressiveness; and (4) its efforts to achieve “sustainable development.” A 
summary of the structural and conceptual approaches as well as underlying national 
images identified is illustrated in Figure 2 below.  
Figure 2: China’s China Culture Year Strategy 
 
Source: Christina Maags 
 
Will Chinese culture do the trick?  
The PRC’s strategy of concentrating on its cultural and economic resources in order 
to accumulate soft power has strengths and weaknesses. It is advantageous for the 
PRC to rely on cultural and economic resources, as states fare best when they choose 
soft-power assets in which they have a comparative advantage [74:16]. Europeans 
have a favorable opinion about Chinese culture and also benefit to some extent from 
the economic relations between Europe and China [13:175]. Therefore, when cultural 
events are selected on the basis of local tastes and exclude sensitive content, the 
party-state makes maximum use of its resources since Chinese culture is presented in 
the most positive way possible. For these reasons, the promotion of Chinese cultural 
national images can be regarded as the PRC’s most promising approach to 
discrediting the “China threat theory” and accumulating soft power.  
The promotion of Chinese culture in general also promises benefits in other areas, 
since this could intensify interest in Chinese cultural products, thereby resulting in 
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greater profit for China’s creative industries [29:34]. Also, opportunities to cooperate 
with foreign governments on cultural issues could support state-level diplomatic 
relations between the countries through enhanced interstate contact. Finally, 
popularizing China’s culture could further be beneficial for making classical Chinese 
history and thought more visible and understandable to European citizens [13:168]. 
However, one must keep in mind that this knowledge does not necessarily lead to 
less criticism of Chinese politics by the European public.  
Despite these potential advantages, the impact of China’s cultural diplomacy remains 
limited. Given the PRC’s negative political national image, advancements made in 
the cultural realm can be immediately demolished through negative press about the 
Chinese political system [75:107]. Since the European public has demonstrated a 
great interest in domestic Chinese politics and has often voiced severe criticism (i.e., 
the Tibetan riots in 2008), it could regard the China Culture Years as being 
“officially orchestrated” by the party-state and thus proof of its authoritarian 
character. The public diplomacy activities of the party-state are frequently gauged as 
“lacking credibility,” so that their effect is confined by political activities [15:302]. 
Also the strategy to jointly advertise the cultural and economic national image could 
prove to be disadvantageous since China’s economy is also associated with negative 
impacts. Examples include the growing trade imbalance on the part of European 
countries with the PRC [12:148], the flooding of markets with cheap Chinese 
products, and job losses among the European labor force as companies move 
production facilities to China [8:86]. Last but not least, although the PRC does not 
represent a direct security threat to Europe, its growing military expenditure does 
concern European citizens [76:10] and undermines the Chinese claim of striving for 
harmony.  
Conclusion    
Since the mid-2000s the Chinese party-state has invested heavily in developing its 
cultural diplomacy capacities worldwide. New public diplomacy institutions and 
think tanks, the construction of Confucius Institutes and China Culture Centers, and 
the expansion of bilateral cultural ties have all been attempts to promote Chinese 
culture abroad. This paper has focused on China Culture Years in Europe as an 
example of China’s cultural diplomacy strategy in order to identify how the PRC 
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organizes such events and which strategic narratives of self-presentation it transmits 
through the cultural events on display.  
The data derived from the CCY programs suggests that the party-state utilizes a 
common strategy to initiate and organize the cultural events, relying particularly on 
the local expertise of Confucius Institutes, China Culture Centers and twin-city 
partnerships in the target country. The analysis of the program content has revealed 
that all programs analyzed were constructed by grouping additional content around a 
set of core events. Here varying blends of traditional and contemporary “high 
culture” were highlighted. In addition, the organizers included events that depicted 
China’s innovativeness and sustainable development in two of three European cases. 
To optimize the impact of the festival, the party-state also selected country-specific 
events in order to make the festival as appealing as possible to the local audience.  
A subsequent qualitative analysis of the events provided insights into which national 
images and narratives of self-presentation the party-state attempted to transmit. 
Through the comparison of the European cases with the Australian case, the author 
has identified four strategic national images, each representing a narrative of its own. 
By focusing on “high culture” events often associated with Western culture, the PRC 
attempted to present itself as a culturally well-developed state equal to Western 
powers. This narrative was supported by theme names such as “Eternal China,” 
which glorified the Chinese empire and staked a claim for civilizational superiority. 
A second cultural national image was also identifiable, namely, China’s “cultural 
unity.” However, since the PRC only portrayed Han Chinese culture, the organizers 
avoided the possibility of audience associations regarding domestic conflicts with 
minorities. In consequence of this omission, the party-state presented an orchestrated 
narrative of a harmonious and unified culture. The incorporation of technological 
events communicated the third national image: that of China’s “innovativeness,” 
which is comparable to Western standards. Finally, by referring to its progress in 
research on environmental protection measures China portrayed itself, fourth, as a 
responsible power striving for “sustainable development.” 
Despite these strategic national images, all of which contain an elaborate narrative 
presenting China in a most favorable way, the CCYs may not have yielded the 
benefits the party-state hoped for. Negative political and economic national images 
as well as Chinese military growth will most likely continue to hamper the impact of 
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Chinese cultural diplomacy in Europe. Nevertheless, an analysis of China’s cultural 
diplomacy strategies and inherent narratives is imperative in order to obtain a deeper 
knowledge of how and with which means the party-state is attempting to promote its 
culture to the European audience. Only by examining the images and narratives 
behind Chinese cultural diplomacy activities can the party-state’s “Charm Offensive” 
be holistically grasped and understood. 
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